Edward VII and the Anglo-French Entente of 1904 by Day, Patricia M
University of Richmond
UR Scholarship Repository
Honors Theses Student Research
Winter 12-17-1971
Edward VII and the Anglo-French Entente of 1904
Patricia M. Day
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.richmond.edu/honors-theses
This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Student Research at UR Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Honors Theses by an authorized administrator of UR Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
scholarshiprepository@richmond.edu.
Recommended Citation
Day, Patricia M., "Edward VII and the Anglo-French Entente of 1904" (1971). Honors Theses. Paper 430.
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LIBRARIES 
1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111 
3 3082 01028 9873 
Edward VII and the Anglo-French Entente 
of 1904 
Senior Thesis 
done for 
Miss Frances Gregory 
Patricia M. Day 
17 December 1971 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
The Baokgrou.nd of the AnglowFrench Entente 
Edward VII as He Was on Beooming King 
Politics and Policies 
The Discussions Between Lansdowne and Cambon 
The Aftermath 
1 
6 
12 
20 
22 
The Background of the Anglo-French Entente 
After the end of the Napoleonic wars, the appearance of 
Ev~ope was changed almost to that or the eighteenth century. 
France had been returned to her old borders, the mu\~itude 
of little kingdoms in Italy and Germany had been reinstated, 
and Russia ha.d taken back the portion of Poland that she had 
acquired in 1793• The general alliance of all European 
countries against a superior France was discontinued as soon 
as France had lost that position. It had been nothing more 
than one of the agreements that European countries made when 
they were under pressure~ The enemy was only the enemy for 
the moment. The wars had not changed that time-honoured 
method of diplomacy. 
Governments were accustomed to make their policies and 
alliances without much reference to public opinions. Inter-
national relations were supposed to be above the comprehension 
of the masses. The public did not, however, take this as an 
1nd1oat1on that they should refrain from having or expressing 
opinions. The situation was simply that public opinion and 
government policy seldom agreed, since what was popularly 
agreeable and what was politically expedient U>eAZ: often two 
separate things. Even in Britain the public did not have 
great influence on foreign affairs. Events in France con-
1ed to make the temper of the British press rise and fall, 
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depending on what was occurring in Paris~ However, the 
British government was ready to make the settlement that 
best suited the cirour;stancea. Therefore, in 1848, England 
and France oarne; to a ,,olnt nction in foreign affairs for the 
first time. That this action was based on mutual distrust 
rather than on brotherly love was not significant. What 
mattered most was that e precedent had been established that 
was to affect the relations of Britain and France for the 
rest or the nineteenth oentury. 1 Foreign relations between 
Brita.in and France were checkered but, unt1.l. the end of the 
century, did not break into open and violent a.nimoas1ty. 
1l1he ministries of both countries• on the contrary• sought ror 
friendly relations as the rule. In 1848 France and Britain had 
come to an amicable arrangement regarding the advancing in-
terests of Russia around the Black Sea.2 All agreements of 
this sort were expected to flounder 1f some other factor 
changed the aspect or the situation. In the case of Britain 
and France, the problem was Greece, and in the heated debate 
that followed Britain's high-handed approach to a trifling 
situation, the Anglo-French alliance almost became a Franco-
Russian one. Britain, along with France and Russia, were 
garentors of Greek independence. Palmerston's rough attitude 
in defending a claimant to British protection was taken as a 
threat. However, before the natural resu\;\;s of his mistake 
were explored by those two countries, Napo1eon III staged his 
coun d'etat 1n Paris. 
Britain had known Napoleon III from the time that he had 
spent in exile there, and knew him to be essentially 
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friendly to British interests. On the other hand, both 
Austria and Russia were unhappy to see a restoration of the 
Bonapartists. Russia in particular felt threatened, because 
ono of France's ma jot" areas for expanding hett interests wa.s 
in Turkey.3 
One of Napoleon III's primary objeot1ves was agreement· 
with Britain. Throughout the Second Empire he had d1souss1ons 
in Paris on current foreign policy, particularly the situation 
in TUrkey befora the Crimean war. Russia• feeling threatened 
as she did, eventually went to war with Turkey, and brought 
France and Britain into the conflict to proteot their common 
interests in the Near East. In this instance, Napoleon was 
sucessful 1n creating the alliance. After the war, however, 
Britain became preoccupied with domestic ~eform and, irked 
by constant pressure trom Napoleon to come to the French oon-
ferenoes. finally refused to participate altogether. Her 
attitude ended definitively the alliance or the war. 
Napoleon never gave his attempts to gain a domploto entente 
with Britain. In his final endeabOr he initiated a policy for 
France that was to become a standard. Eventually, with the 
help of oircumsta.noes., this idea would lead to the .result 
that he had worked so hard for. 4 When he went to war 1n 1870, 
he and his government were determined to prove that the cause 
or France was morally superior to that of Prussia. This idea 
did not help France at Sedan, but later, after the harshness 
of Prussian peace terms in annexing Alsace-Lorraine, it 
~nauired a certain authority. The French did not hesitate 
emind the world of their plight whenever it served their 
purpose to generate a little moral indignation in their 
behalf. 
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After 1810. relations went back to normal between Britain 
and France; that is, since the beg1ni."1ing of the French Third 
Republic, a similarity or pr1no1ples and institutions made a 
base for Br1-1:ain and France to maintain their ordinary 
pleasant relations.5 As long as Franoe remained peaceful 
this situation would continue, for nothing suited Britain 
better than having a peaceful neighbor on the continent. 
Gambette and. his colleagues were in favour of the friendly 
relations, since this gave them someone to oall on if Prussia 
moved against France again. However, there was a new and 
forceful imperialism growing in Franoe, whose ambitions 
aimed at colonial expansion. Afriea was France's best ohanoe, 
and it was here that France and Britain suddenly found them-
selves face to faoe in violent opposition.6 
The imperialists in France were convinced that an agree• 
ment ment with Britain could only be a hinderance as far as 
colonial aff a1rs were concerned. While they controlled the 
French government, France and Britain almost oame to blows 
several times before the turn of the oentur7. There was, how-
ever, heavy political unrest in France, since the imperialists 
favoured an alliance or convenience with Germany, to back her 
against Britain if she should have to make a stand on colonial 
affairs. The Germanophobea in France fought this settlement 
bitterly, unable and unwilling to forget that Prussia had 
A~~~ France so much harm in 1a70.? They believed that eventually 
they would again arrive at a settlement of all problems with 
Britain. However, French public opinion in general was alive 
with bad feeling for the British, especially after the affair 
at Fashoda. The mood in Britain was hardly different. 
As A. J. p. Taylor so aptly noted1 °Someone has said 
that nine English traditions out or ten date from the la.st 
third of the nineteenth century; and this is certainly true 
of foreign affairs.•8 From the end of the Napoleonic wars 
in 1821, friendship, not 1nm1ty, had been the rule between 
Britain and France. Yet, a contrary idea pars1sts asserting 
that France since the time of the Hundred Years WBr was the 
avowed and declared enemy of Britain, that nothing could 
ever make them come together in peaceful agreement, and that 
the Anglo-French ententq that finally came about aftor the 
turn of the century was a miracle. Actually, Britain and 
France were allies through most of that period. It was 
simply the colonial situation that so roused the presses of 
ea.oh country that papers insulted one another•s leaders and 
oustoms• Not even the prestige or Victoria saved her name 
in the Paris pepers. If a settlement oould be found. for the 
colonial s1tuat1on, then the real barrier to an entent~ would 
be gone. This was the state of affairs between Britain and 
France when Edward VII became king of' England in 1901. 
Edward VII as He Was on neooming King 
The position of a monarch, in a country as subject to 
Parliamentary process as Britain• needs some examination. 
The position of Queen Viotoria 1 in fact, was unique in British 
history and in the history or EU!•opu By right of age and 
re lat ion of some kind to every royal house in Bu.rope, .she was 
able to offer her foreign office an influence in continental 
courts never befdre. held by any country. Her correspondence 
was voluminous and ranged over every subject. As the head 
of a great family she was able, as a benevolent but stern 
grandmother, to keep reins on anyone who seemed likely to 
become a source o:f' trouble in the balance or Europe. For 
some time before her death, Victoria was the only person who 
could keep her grandson, William II of Germany, Wlder any 
kind or controi.9 Yet, there were things that she could not 
do because of her inability to travel extensively. 
The situation with Edward VII was entirely different. 
Whereas he could not off er the voluminous correspondence and 
the influence of age, he was exceedingly widely traveled, and 
knew every sovereign in Europe personally. He had, also, 
iraveled in the Near East and the Orient. and knew many or 
these rulers. However, Edward's favourite place to visit 
was and had always been France. Since childhood Edward had 
preferred things French in contrast to his mother's preference 
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for things German. 10 He had friends among all walks of life 
in France, as he could not exactly have in Britain, especially 
among the actors and actresses of Paris. The affection that 
he held for the French was cordially returned by them and they 
were accustomed to seeing him incognito at the Hotel Bristol, 
strolling the boulivards and using the cafes. His popularity 
only faded during the Fashoda affair when he was violently 
and vilely attacked in the Paris press as the leading J .'·.~:,:·r:'. 
representative of England, next to the Queen. 
Edward's attitude towards Germany, also, comes in this 
context. He was familiar with the country of his father and 
was hardly one to see a threat in everything that that country 
did. He did not regard the unification of the German states 
as anything but a good occurrence. 11 However, Edward had 
several reasons for disliking the situation in Germany. These 
reasons were mainly personal and yet they could not help but 
affect his feeling for Germany. In the first place, his wife, 
Alexandra of Denmark, had a violent hatred for Germany because 
it had taken two provinces from the southern boundary of her 
country in a waF that Germany herself had provoked for that 
purpose. It was only natural that the Prince of Wales, as he 
then was, should try to maintain ao impartial attitude and 
yet still be drawn on the side of his wife. 
Secondly, the Bismarcks, father and son, were strongly 
opposed to the influence of the English house in German af-
fairs, and consequently were the avowed enemies of the Prince 
and Princess of Wales. Edward's sister, the Empress Frederick, 
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had tried vainly t as the 11 beral English wife of ai."1 enlightened 
Crown Prince• to introduce the British method of representa-
tion and social raforn1 to Germany. The Bismarcks had helped 
to block her ambitions and were suspicious of any of her 
family• Finally the1~e was the relationship between Edward 
and his nephew the Emperor William .. 
William had been thoroughly trained by the Bismarcks and 
the tutors that they got for him to despise the ·policies of 
his father ru1d mother. and had had a deep distrust of every-
thi?lt1 English instilled in ttim. As a result, Y1ll1am and his 
u."lcle were almost boun.cl to clash often. William was inclined• 
because he envied Edwardis position in the courts of Europe, 
to insult him a:i'l.d play down to him at every opportunity. 
This attitude on the part of his nephew more than once led to 
such anger from Edward that a formal apology had to be forced 
from William by his grand.mother. 12 Relations between the two 
men were never, even at the best times, good, especially after 
Edward became king.* 
~fter the affair at Fashod.a caused such an uproar in 
France, Edward found. himself no longer welcome there. He 
* After the death or the Emperor Frederick, Edward visited 
his sister in Germany, only to find that she was subjected to 
every hwn111at1on by her son and by Bismarok, not even allowed 
a proper house or freedom of movement. Very angry over her 
treatment, Edward managed, by threatening to tell all England 
of her plight, to get her situation 1mproved.1J 
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we11-t instead. to take the . waters at Bad.en and to oontemplate 
the practicality ilf an alliance with Germany. During this 
pe.riod he considered. this alignment of the countries in Eu.-
rope for the one and only time and gave it his tentative 
support. Long before Fra.~ce had forgiven him, he had forgiven 
France and was again looking for ways to return their feelingo 
for himself and Britain to their former warmth. 
Concerning the French alliance, Edward had a long hiG-
tory of worldng for such an end.. As far back as 1866 Edward 
had spoken in favour of the understa.ndine. with the French. 
During the following years, a.s age and ability grooually made 
a place for him in th9 t'.k'ust of his mother's cabinets, he was 
to speak with the knowledge and backing of t11e foreign office. 
Many French ambassadors to Britain became his friends in the 
fashionable social world. or London where the Prince of Wales• 
rule was U."ld.isputed. Edward would have private audiences w1 th 
them on the possibility of the British and French coming to 
some ltind of agreement.14 
For a while after the overthrow of the Second Empire, 
with which he had naturally been in olose sympathy, F..dward 
stopped these informal talks. However, the French continued 
to send interesting and witty men to represent them in England, 
and Edward was soon back on his old footing with them. 
Towards the end of the nineteenth century the first am-
bassador to really promote the Anglo-French entente as a 
definite end came to London. Needless to say, he and Edward 
got along well. This French ambassador was almost as important 
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to the entente as it was eventually set up, as the Cambon 
embassy, which tends always to overshadow the importance of 
this foreru."'lll.er. Courcel has not yet been recognized as 
h~ving the importance that he had.. He was undoubtedly one 
of France's most able diplomats and a real architect of the 
future settlement between Britain and France. His trouble 
was that he was in advance or his time. neither country was 
ready ·ror what he was proposing, a.s they would be several 
years later when Cambon took the London job. 1.5 
When Couroel began his campaign for an alliance with 
Britain, his only real ally was the Prince of Walos. who 
agreed with h1m completely and did everything in his power 
to make oortain that Courcel got some kind of hearing in the 
foreign office. 
After he beoame king in January 1901 1 the1•e was an 1nte:r-
val of time before he could continue his visits to France. 
In the first place there was all the planning of the corona-
tion to attend to. At the last moment Edward was struck with 
appendicitis and the entire ceremony ha.d to be postponed for 
several months. Secor..d.ly, the situaticm with France, who was 
still angry and humiliated over the Fashod.a affair and was 
sympa.thetic with tte Boers in the unfortunate South African 
war, made the visit of the king extremely difficult. Even 
as P~ince, virulent attacks in the French press had prevented 
him from going as he usually did to France in 1900. The 
position of the king would be all the mo1•e troublesome. 
Still, it was with France that Edward's natural sympathies 
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lay and he was determined to return to France and to do all 
that he could to improve the relations between his country 
and the French. 
Edward ex,ressed his determination to undertake this 
trip to his cabinet ea.rly in 1903. Here he ran into fresh 
difficulty. 1.,,a.nsd.ovme, who was now the Foreign Secretary, 
objected to such a journey on the grounds that there was no 
telling what tho French might resort to if they found the 
king of the country which they so hated within their reach. 
It coulcl only load. to a. situation t·ihere Britain would be in-
sulted to the point of making ·aar with France, something 
that the govar11ment or Er-1.ta.in wan determined to avoid if 
they could possibly do ~o. 16 The French government did not 
share the feelings of its public, however, and the president 
co:rd1ally invited the English king to stop 111 Paris on the 
return part of' Edwa1~s 1 s first p:rogress as lting. Edward was 
delighted to accept. 
Politics and Policies 
When Edward VII became king, Salisbury was still Prime 
Minister. Throughout his tenure of office, both as Prime 
Minister and as Foreign Secretary, Salisbury had been on the 
side of an entente with France. However. he was, also, un-
willing to give any leeway in the colonial situation, and so 
his negotiating powers with the French were negated by his 
stand~ This was espeoially true regarding the problem of 
Egypt. Still he was unwilling to write Off any discussion 
between the French and the British. Twice during various 
terms in off ice the idea of talks between the two countries 
had been begun, only to be stopped by some occurrence on the 
colonial scene. However, 1n 1902 Salisbury was forced to give 
up the foreign secretaryship, because ot ill health, which he 
had held tor some time consecutively with the prime m1n1ster-
sh1p. I.ansdowne. under his no longer too watchful eye, be-
came the Foreign Secretary for the conservative government.17 
Lansdowne, in 1902, was far more interested in an alli-
ance with Germany than in one with France. As far as he was 
oonoerned the problems between the two countries precluded 
any chance ot settlement. Besides, he thought that there 
were definite advantages to joining with Germany,. who was at 
this time the fastest growing country economically. Friendly 
relations between these two powerful countries,, Britain and 
12 
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Germany, would have benefits for them both 1n the mater or 
trade and in the colonial world. 18 In this feeling Lansdowne 
had the backing or several members or the cabinet, among 
whom the one most to be reckoned with was Joseph Chamberlain. 
The French were ready to negotiate for some time before 
the British govex-nment finally got some united action on 
what they wanted to do. From the time that 'l'heophile Deloasse 
ca.me to the off ice of foreign affairs he deo1ded that the 
thing that would most benefit France was an alliance with 
Britain• Germany was the real threat, even though for a long 
time the policy or Germany had been to back the desires of 
the French in everything that they wished.. except the return 
or Alsaoe'!MLorraine. Bismarck knew the value of keeping 
France and Britain at odds. However., in the eyes or France. 
Germany's growing economic and military might was directed 
pr1amr11y at the French• Germany, not France, was to be the 
dominant power 1n Europe. Therefore• Deloasse had the resi-
dent ambassador or France 1n London, M· Paul cambon, sound 
out the English a.gain on their feelings. 
The French cause had a few ardent supporters among the 
English even before there was a chance or getting public 
discussion of an entente. Salsibury, as noted, was agreeably 
1nol1ned, while he was Foreign Minister, to have settlement 
talks with France. The impediment was France, and. her probt-
lem was to decide whom she hated more: England, because of 
Fashoda, or Germany, because or Alsaoe-Lorraine. 19 With 
French Germanophobe reeling as· strong as it was, only one 
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answer was possible in the end. Delcasse and the government 
of France would be willing to come to some settlement. 
Delcasse had a new situation on his side 1n playing up 
to Britain, now. France had just recently conolUded an entente 
with Fussiat and the scene of Europe was divided into two 
armed camps; the Triple Alliance against the new Dual Alli-
ance. Britain, in return, had just finished settling an 
agreement with Japan, because she felt so left out or Europe. 
What France saw oom1ng over the horizon was a war between 
Japan and Russia. As Russia's only ally, France would auto-
matically expect the Russians to ask them to keep the defensive 
end of the agreement and help them (the Russians) against 
Japan. It France were to join Russia, then they might reasona-
bly expect Japan to call for the aid of Britain, and France 
would find herself faced with war with the British Empire. 
Even with the help of the Russian fleet. wh1oh had been 
promised them if they needed it, Britain would win• almost 
certainly. To avoid war on these terms, it was imperative 
that France find some way of coming to a settlement with 
Britain. 20 
However, the problem or how to bring about this necessary 
measure still remained. The French Third Republic was a 
democracy of little stability. Governments had already set 
the precedent or rising and falling with alarming frequency. 
Any step that the government took would have to be supported 
by the French public or the government would fall before it 
could put its policy into action. At that time the French 
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public was indulging itself in a veritable orgy of mud-sling-
ing• directed at Britain because of Fashoda and because the 
French took the side or the Boers. Deloasse allowed his 
feelings to be known in private conversations conducted both 
in Paris and in his name in London by the French ambassador. 
He explained that he was willing for the two countries. to 
form an entente, but that with Frenoh public feelings as 
they were 1 chances of open success were minimal. 21 
The English government was in a better position at home 
to advocate an alliance with the French because the English 
public had suddenly been thrown into outrage by the outspoken 
opinions from the German Re1sohstag on the south African war. 
That war was not exactly popular at home, but no one who was 
not British had the right to insult a policy of the British 
Empire in such terms. The press hated Germany with a violent 
passion, and the full force of English sarcasm was turned by 
editors, even of the most reasonable papers, on the leaders 
of the German government.22 
At this point, Lansdowne would have been ready to come 
to some type ot pr1bate terms with the French whether public 
opinion in England had been agreeable or not. Iansdowne had 
reversed his stand 1n foreign affairs--nothi.ng was more re• 
markable about Lanadowne•s conduct of the foreign office in 
his early years there than his ability to shift his position•• 
and had decided that the only way for Britain to be able to 
make a stand in the future on the continent was to have an 
alliance of some kind with France. The French ambassador in 
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London was notified from Deloasse to carry on informal talks 
with Lansdowne 'E!ven though at the time there was no chance of 
these becoming the stated policy of either country. 
La.nsdowne•s change of position had a reasonable basis 
for all its apparent suddeness. The specter or a continental 
coalition seemed about to lift its head. against Britain. 
Germany was doing her best to lure France and her ally Russia 
into the 'rriple Alliance*' If she succeeded there would be 
no one to side with Britain; her•splendid isolation" would 
be guarenteed, not because she wanted it but because she had 
no ohoioe. Considering the colonial situation, where, every 
European country with colonial ambitions found itself. blocked 
by the Br1t1sh empire 1 the ine~itable result of such an 
alliance would mean war against Britain by all the countries 
in 1t. 24 
M. Cambon had been 1nstruoted by Deloasse to bring up 
the touohy subject of colonial conflict and to try for some 
solution that would be agreeable to the English foreign 
m1n1stry. Siam and Morocco were the topics and the French 
tentatively suggested that they were ready to find some 
settlement. As M· Cambon said• the English understood the 
feeling of having to baok down from a position: it affaoted 
the prestige of the country that had to do it. Therefore the 
settlement would have to be one that allowed the French to 
come out of the agreement with their pride and honour still 
in taot. 
Lansdowne said that he understood the situation of 
France. He decided that the beat way or overcoming the 
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colonial problem was to give up Morocco to the French. 
Cambon, for his part, agreed that England should be allowed 
the rights in Egypt. These agreements were secret, since 
neither the English people nor the French were prepared to 
accept a settlement between their two countries. 2S In other 
words, the agreement between the two countries was essen-
tially settled, except for working out the details. The 
problem was still public acceptance, the bugbear to all 
international diplomacy. 
At this moment the setermination of the king to 
visit France, while it might have the unhappy results that 
several cabinet members thought, might,on the other hand, 
improve the situation between Britain and France to where the 
discussions could be made public. Edward himself thought 
that this might be the result and was anxious to try out 
his abilities. Therefore, on the return leg of his journey 
around the Iberian penisula and Italy, Edward stopped in 
Paris.~~ 
There was little enough enthusiasm shown him as he gob 
off of the train 1n Paris• President Loubet was the only 
one there who seemed glad to see the king. (Loubet was the 
one who had so cordially invited the king to stop in Paris, 
so that Delcasse•s Entente might have a chance.) The 
Parisians observed the king's progress through the city 
with sullen faces or with cries of •vive FashodaJ• Ed.~ard 
took no notice of the frigidity 1n the air and responded 
to what salutes were offered him. When one of his aides 
spoke seriously to him as they were going into the embassy 
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and said that the French did not like them, Edward replied, 
truthfully enough,"Why should they?" He meant that they had 
no reason to _...,. yet.27 
i'hat night Edward went to the opera, where the atmo-
sphere was scarcely less oh1lly than it had been that morning. 
There are too many conflicting reports on what Edward ac~ually 
said or did during the intermission, when he paid such warm 
attention to a notable Frenchwoman, for anything to be set 
down as raot. Whatever the o1rcumstances, the news that the 
English king could be so gallant and sympathetic, and spoke 
suoh excellent Pranoh, raced all over Paris by morning. The 
Parisians began to remember who this k1ng was: not someone 
of whom they had never heard who came to them as the Russian 
Emperor had, with unsm1ling countenance and conso1ous 
superiority of his titles and power, who insulted their 
democracy with his looks, but someone whom they knew well. 
It was that same prince who had always visited and loved 
France, A boulivardier like themselves, who loved and under• 
stood them. The frigidity Of the day before was almost 
melted by the time he drove out the next day. 28 
Both the Parisians and the English in Paris were eager 
to hear what the king had in mind when he rose to address 
them, and through them the whole or their countries. 
It is scarcely necessary to tell you with 
what sincere pleasure I find myself once 
more in Paris, to which, as you know, I 
have pais very frequent visits with ever 
increasing pleasure, and for which I reel 
an attachment fortified by so many happy 
and ineffaoable memories. The days of 
hostility between the two countries are, 
I am certain, happily at an end. There 
may have been misunderstandings and causes 
of dissension in the past, but that is all 
happily over and forgotten. The friendship 
of the two countries is my oonstant preoc-
cupation, and I count on you all who enjoy 
French hospitality in their magnificent city 
to aid me to reach this goal. 29 
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This mention of friendship between the two countries, which 
Edward put so carefully in a prominent place in his speech, 
was supposed to mean more than the king could openly speak 
of, but the undertones were strong enough to come through. 
Edward was firmly baoking the entente, and was asking the 
French whom he had just won to his side to support him and 
their leaders willingly. His speech affected the position 
of both countries in the world· 
By the time Edward left Paris the French were literally 
at his feet. uv1ve notre ro1ru Most people who were witnesses 
to the change were a.mazed. The English were probably more 
amazed than any. All the countries or Europe knew their 
king better than they whom he ruled did.JO 
The Discussions Between Lansdowne and Cambon 
With the certainty that their agreements would be 
accepted in both their countries, Lansdowne and Cambon 
were able to go on with their talks. Though the main 
issues had been mentioned and agreed to there were still 
the details to be worked out and the minor items needed to 
be inserted in their proper places. 
The foreign secretary of Britain, in discussing the 
matter, had come to several conclusions. In letters exchanged 1 
between Lansdowne and Cromer, the British consul-general 
in Egypt, certain points were decided on. They agreed 
that France should have the rights in Morocco, provided 
that Britain would get the rights in Egypt, that the sea 
coast of Morocco would be neutralized, and that British 
trade would not be put under any special restrictions. If 
all these points were acknowledged by the French, then there 
would be no problem.32 
The French had some points in mind also. They wanted 
the director-general of Antiquities in Egypt :bo remain a 
Frenchman, and they wanted the French schools that had been 
established in Egypt to remain in French hands and not to 
be at a disadvantage in the English governed province. 
Both of these problems were settled in the discussions. 
In addition, they agreed that Spain, because of her proximity 
to Morocco, should receive special assurances of good will 
~o 
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from the t\fO countries and should get the same benef 1 ts 
that France was going to allow Britain to have.. No forti-
fications would be built along the coast opposit Gibraltar 
and Spain would be allowed to have as a sphere of influence 
any territory that the sultan of Moz•oooo was supposed to 
control outside of Melilla- These last agreements were 
under the secret settlement part of the enyente as it was 
written. The problems that France and Britain had had in 
otha~ parts of their colonies, for example in Newfoundland, 
were not specifically mentioned in the agre~ment that 
Lansdowne and Cambon signed, but they were d1sousned and 
settled.33 
The Aftermath 
To anyone casually examining the results or the d1scus-
s1ona and the treaty. it would seem that Britain got the 
'best of the bargain. She got something that already existed 
and. which she in faot already controlled: the province or 
Egypt• which was well set up, ready tor them to govern, 
and. in which trade was already established. France got 
a chaotic country without any government 
could control it, 
anyone could guess at the time. 
In actuality, France got the best or the deal, for 
two reasons. First, Morocco proved to be a largely under-
developed. d.ountry that had great potential. She became a. 
valuable area tor trade: her wealth had been hidden, not 
nonexistant. Secondly, Delcasse knew what he was doing 
when ho settled the entente with the British as he did. 
The French, e.s it worked out, had paid their end or the 
ba.rgain: England had full sway in Egypt. However, they 
had taken the promisecithe British for things to oome. 
The British could not fail to support the Fren~h in Boroooo 
without seriously da.~aging their good name. Delca.sse 
almost certainly knew that Germany would hardly let such 
influence grow in Africa without challenging 1 t on dlehalf 
of their growing empire there. The British would be forced 
to help the French against the Germans, who could be counted 
-oJ... 
on to start the rouble. It would not only aid the French 
in Africa but would strengthen the ties of the §ntenpe.35 
The British were not looking for such long term effects. 
It was the apparent that they appreciated, not the fact, 
23 
and they thoUght that they had gotten the best end of the 
agreement. The settlement bill passed with great popularity 
in the House of Commons. 
In the final analysis• the praise for the entente 
rests with four people. Deloasse is the first, beoau.se he 
held to his idea of an agreement with Britain through all 
the instability of a government of the Third Hepublia a.'11d 
was successful in the end. Cambon is the seoondt because 
he sat down and went through the settlement point by point 
during all the long months of negotiations. Lansdowne 
is the third• because in the end, when once he.bad been 
convert~d to the idea of an alliance with France, he supported 
it whole ... heartedly and to the best interests of Britain 
as he saw them. 
However, the man who most influenced the successful 
outcome or the negotiations that had been carried on between 
Britain and France was Edward· Without his popularity and h 
his charm the Anglo-French Entente would not have been 
possible. It was he who removed the barriers that would 
have prevented the French government from agreeing to the 
enteµte and getting it through the Chambers in their assembly. 
He showed them Englishmen who had the best intere~ts of both 
countries in mind. 1 not for the benefit of empire but in thei~ 
common good. 
(' 
'1: ~ j 
good tbcir rights to tl1t: ,ucccs•.irin, witholll :tny risl: <Jf ''-';·i(Jw; interference 
on our p:trt, i-1c>rcv:cu \1·ill, to :ill intent; :rnd 1n11 pose:'., LC'cornc !Jcfo~·c ]('!lg 
a Frcncli pru1·i 11cc. 
The l]Uc:,til>ll, thn<'fm(" lei n1y mirid i:; tlii.~: li:1vc we :-u1y c,Jijccrir,n u, 
1'.fornccu hccCJniint~ a Fn:·wl1 pr(lvi11cc; J'cr.\r11J:illy, I ~u· 111111c, pni\·i1L:d 
always (r) t!ut \\'t get all adccp1:1lc <Jllid f'i'O quo in Egypt a11d chcwhcrc; 
and (2) t\:~:t the French c"1np1y \\.'itli ynur thee co1Jditirn1s :1s rc:g.1rcls 
1'.forocrn. These:, if I u1Hlcrst:1nd rigl.tly, :1rl· (1) tl1<.: ~c:1Lci:ird i:; tu be neu-
tralised; (2) a proper regard .i~ to he slHi\\'Il tu Sp:rnish inicrcsts :llld sus-
ceptibilities; :incl (3) J guaralltfe is to bc.: obt:1i11ecl that British trade and 
enterprise ,,·ill not be placed at any legal dis:1cl\'Jntage in Morocco. 
[Declaration between the United Kingdom and France: rtspccting Egypt 
and l\forocco. Signed at London, April 8, 190.;.] 
Article I. 
His Britannic Majesty's Government declare tli:it they h:ivc no intention 
of altering the political status of Egypt. 
The Go\'ernmcnt of the french Republic, for their part, dccbre that they 
will not obstruct the action of Great Britain in th:it country by asking that 
a limit of time be fixed for the British occup:nion or in any other manner, 
and that they give their assent to the draft Khedivi:il Decree :innexed to the 
present Arrangernrnt, containing the gu:1r;1ntcc.:s rnnsidcrccl ncccss:1ry f"r 
the protection of th<.: interests of the Egyptian bondholders, on the ccm·Jition 
th:it, after its promulgation, it cannot be modified in any w:iy without the 
consent,, of the Powers Signatory of the Convention of London of 1 SS5. 
·It is agreed that the post of Director-General of ;\ntiquities in Egypt shall 
continue, as in the past, to be entrustccl to a French savant. 
The French schools in Egy1Jt shall continue to enjoy the s:1me liberty as 
in the past. 
Article II. 
The Government of the French Republic dccbre that they have no 111-
tention of alterin" the politic1l sutus of Morocco. 
His Drit:innic1'Lijcsty's Cowrnrnc11l, fnr tk:ir F'.rt, recognise that it :ip-
pertains to Fr:rncc, rnort p:irticubrly :is a Power \\'ho:-.c domi11in11s :ire con-
termilltd!S for a grc:1t cli.'l:ilkc \\'ith tlt(i>e of !-forocco, to prcsn\'C (lrdn in 
th:1t co:i11try, :rnd tu pro\'ick :issist:rncc for the pur1ws·c of all :1clmi11istr:HiYc, 
ecrnwm~.:, fi11.m·:i.1l, ;111d rnilir;iry reforms \\'liicli it m:1y rCl]llirc. 
They dccbre th;ir thcv will. not (lktruct the action taken liy Fr.111cc for 
tl1is p11;11ci\t', pr"'·icbl 1!:.11 >II< Ii :c<ti"n sl1.1ll !t'.t\'\' i111.1c1 t11c 1i1~li1-; \\'l1i«li 
(;1r.1I l~1i1;1i1i, i11 \ill!/\' of '!'1!'.lli1-;, (:11/l\Tltli1111·., ;111d 11· .. 1.:',<' ('!IJi!)"· Ill 
,1s~ lZE1\Dl:\'CS Ji"-: H!l\(JJ'L\:'< J]i\'JUiZY <i:<CL i~~1.1 jr:'h/•. Xii/ 
.Morocco, inch1din~; th('. right <if C(J:Jstifl'.' tr:1dc b~:t\'/ 1 :cn tli'.: pun·; of ~1forr1:;cr, 
enjoyed by J;ritishL ve:svJc >in cc.: I'.,)'Ji. '' - ' 
Article Ill. 
His Ilrit:rnnic M:ijc:;ty's Gm·c:rnmcnt, for their part, will rcs?_:n the rif~l1:, 
wliicl1 Fr:1ncc, in \'irt11c of Trc1tics, CrJ11vrntir111s, :rnrl 11sa,;;c, enjoys in Fgypt, 
includi11g the ri~;lit fJ[ cwsti11g tL1dc between Fgypti:111 port~, acc1,nbl tfJ 
Frrnch vcs,cls. 
Article IV. 
The two Governments, being cqt1:1lly attacher! to the principle of C<Jm-
rnerci:d libcrt y both in Egypt and MrJrocu,, dccbre tl1at they will nrJt, i11 
those countries, countenance :my i1icr1uality either in the imposition of cm-
toms duties or other taxes, or of railway transport charges. 
The trade of both nations with ~forocrn and with Egypt sh:ill enjoy the 
same treatment in transit through the French :rnd Briri,Ji pmses:;iom in 
Africa. An Agreement between the two Governmems sh:ill settle the con<li-
tions of such transit and shall determine the points of entry. 
This mutual eng:1gement shall be liincling for a period of thirty years. 
Unless this s:ipubtion is expressly clenouncecl at lc:ist one year in advance, 
the period shall be extended for fi \'C years at a ti me. 
Nevertheless, the GoYernment of the French Republic reserve to them-
selves in J\forocco, and His Ilritannic Majesty's Go\'ernment reserve to them-
selves in Egypt, the right to see that the concessions for roads, railw:1ys, ports, 
&c., arc only gr:rnted 011 such conclitirim as \\'iii m:1i1Jt:1i11 i11t:1ct the :1uthority 
of the St:1tc O\'cr these great unclert:il;ings of pulilic i111erest. 
Article V . 
. His Britannic Majesty's Gm·crnment declare th:it they will use their in-
fluence in order that. the French oJlicials now in t11e Egypti:1n scr\'icc may 
not be pbcccl under conditions ks-; aclv:mtageous tli:rn thosl'. applyini.; tu the 
British officials in the same sen·ice. 
The Gm·ernment of the French Republic, for t11cir part, would m:1ke no 
objection to the applic:1tion of an:1logous conditions w British onici:ils 110\': 
in the 1\foorish service. 
Article VI. 
In order to insure the free pass:1~e of the Suez C:111:1!, Jiis lhit:mnic :\hj-
esty's Government clccl:ire th:H they adhere tn the >cipubtio11~ of the Treaty 
of the 29th Oct(lkr, '""':. and tl1:1t the\' a~i«:e tn their kinu put in lllrcr·. 
Th('. free pass:l<'C of t!w C:rn:1l k'in~ tl1:1s ~'t1:1Llntccd, the c~Yt1tion nf t11« 
J:iq ~c11trn<c rl'1,:1r:1;;r:q1l1 1 :is \':l·ll >s c1f p.:;.";'.1:111!1 :>(If .\r1i, le \'Iii ril- tl1,1t 
'f1c:1ty will rrn1:1i11 i11 ;1ky.111ll'. 
Article 1/11. 
In or<l-cr to secure the free p:tss:!ge uf tlic Slr;:its (Jr Cihr:1lt:1r, t!l"c t\','C> 
Go\·crnmcnts agree not to permit the: erection cJ :rny Lniflr::1tirn1.', 1;1 slr:rtcgic 
wci:ks on th:1t portion of the cu:iot <Jf ~lfoff<C:J crni1r1ri«c-cl b~t\\'tu1, l1ut not 
including, Me:lilb :me! tlic heights whid1 uM1!!1:tnd the right l1:11Jl: rif the 
Riwr Sd;ou. 
This condition clues not, however, :1pply to the pL1ccs :1t prc,cnt 111 tl:c 
occup:ition of Sp:iin on the )\foori,]1 rn:::,t uf the Mcclitcrr:111c:i11. 
Article VIII. 
The two Co\'crnmcnts, inspired liy their fctling of sincere frirnclship for 
Sp.1in, take into spcci:il consideration the interests which tl1:it coumry clcri\'cs 
from her geogr:iphical position and from her territori:il pos'.cssions on the 
1vfoorish co:ist of the Mecliterr:inean. In regard to these interests the French 
Go\'ernrnent \\'ill come to an underst:inding with the Spanish Government. 
The agreement which m:iy be come to· on the subject bctwe\'.11 France 
and Spain sh:ill be communicatccl to His Brit:innic Majesty's Government. 
Article IX. 
The two Governments agree to afford to one another their diplom::itii: 
support, in order to obt:iin the execution of the cbuscs of the present Dec-
laration reg:irding Egypt :incl i\forocco. 
In witness whereof his Excellency the r\mbassaclor of the French Re-
public at the Court of His Maje>ty the King of the United Kingdom of 
Gre:it Brit:iin and Ireland and of the British Dominion' beyond i.he Sc:is, 
Emperor of India, :ind His Majesty's Princip:il Secret:iry of State for foreign 
Ai1airs, duly authorized for that purpose, bve ,igned the pre,rnt Dechr;1-
tion and h;1vc :ilfo:ed thereto their seals. 
Done at Lo11don, in duplicate, the Sth (by of J\pril, I<)')i-
(Sign:itures of Lord Linsdownc and M. Paul Cambon follow.) 
Secret Article !. 
In the event of either Government finding themselves comtrained, hy the 
force of circumstances, to modify their policy in respect to Egypt and l\fo-
rocco, the engagements which they h;ivc undertaken to\\'arcls c;icl1 otl1cr by 
Articles IV, Vl nnd Vll of the Dcclar:itioll of tu-clay's d:ite \<,'C1tdd rern:1i11 
inuct. 
Secret Article fl. 
His Rit~111nic ?-.fajcsty's Go\"crnmcnt h:lYC llO present intrntion uf prupl>S-
ing to the I\•\1·crs :my cli:111gcs in tl1,· sp.tcm nf tlit· C1pituhti,>t1', (11 i11 tlk 
J"udici:d r,r,,_1lli,.1ti<11l (If l;.\')'j'I. ti 1.. I 
4~-l REJ\L)l~GS E'; EUlUJi'L\~< I iJ.S'JUin '.-iJ:< 1 :1: 1':;; I U1,·1" Xii! 
Inti1cevcntoftlJCircomidni11~; it ck,i::1L1,_.u,intrr;(1uv i:1 i.{~)pl ref•,;·:,, 
te11dinf'; to ;is,irnihtc tlic Egyptid11 kgishtiw :,y:,tc;n't(J tltdl i:1 iurcc i1; c'1l:·.·; 
civilisu: COll!llries, the Go\'ern111c11t of the· J.'rcwl1 lzq,11L!ic \·:ill 11r1t rd:h•.: 
to c11lcrl:1i11 :lily such jll'"j'(1:,:1b, ci11 1l1r 111HL1-.L1ndi11,'.', 1)1:!( ] Ji•, l!rit:11 11 ,:,_ 
1'fajc.'oi)'\ (;()\'l'rJil11e11t will :1grcc to l'Itl< rl:1i11 tLr: :,11t:.~;1·'oli 1 i11•; il1:1l tl11· (;"1·-
ernmenl of the Frrnch ]{epulilic may k1'.'<~ to rn:rl:e tr' tl1un wi1h :r l'iei'.' c,f 
introch1cing simihr reforms in fllorocco. 
Secret Article Ill. 
The two Governments agree that a cert:ii11 extent of ~1foori,Ji territory 
adjacent to :Mclilb, Ceuta and other Presides ~lwulcl, whenever the Sultan 
ceases to exercise :iuthority over it, come witl1in the sphere of influence of 
Sp:1i11, :ind tli:ll the :iclministr:1tion of the co:1st from Mclill:i :1s f:ir a~;, but not 
i11cluding, tlie hcighb on the right li:111l: o( the Sdiou ~lt:tll lie i11lrt1\tcd lrJ 
Spain. 
Nevertheless, Spain would previously have to give her form:il :isscnt to 
the provisions of Articles IV and VII of the Declaration of to-tby's <late, and 
undertake to carry tl1cm out. 
She would also have to undertake not to alienate the \\'hole or :i part of 
the territories placed under her authority or in her ~phcre of innurnce. 
Secret Article H'. 
If Spain, when invited to assent to the prnvisirn1s (JI the preceding ~r1i1.ic, 
should think proper to dccli11e, the 1\rr:ir1gcmrnt bctv:ccn 1:r:1ncc a11cl (;rc:ll 
Brit::iin, ::is embodied in the Decbraticin of tod:iy's tbtc, would be none the 
less applicdilc. 
Secret Article V. 
Should the consent of the otlH:r Powers lo tl1c drafL Deuce mentir1:1cd 111 
Article I of the Dcclar:ition of lo-day's tbtc not be 0~1t.iinccl, the Govcr1ll!K'il'. 
of the French Republic \\'ill not oppos<: tlie rcpay111e11t at p.ir of the Cu 1r-
a11tccd, Privileged :incl Unifil'cl Ddits after tl1c 151h ]lily, lljIO. 
Done :it I,011rl1>11, i11 rlu11lic.1tc, tl1:~ ~:,]i chy ,,f .\pril, "/'-i· 
(Sign;iturcs of L()rrl l,:!Jlsdt1\\lle and ;-.1, 1'.1lll C!ml1011 fo!lo1-.·.) 
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